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Begier v. IRS: Tracing Trust 
Fund Taxes in Bankruptcy 
l. INTRODUCTION 
Transfers of a debtor's property to a creditor made ninety days 
prior to filing a bankruptcy petition are, in most instances, voidable by 
the bankruptcy trustee. 1 However, if the debtor transfers assets which 
are not her own, the trustee cannot vacate the transfer. More specifi-
cally, property a debtor holds in trust for another entity is not property 
of the debtor and is therefore excepted from the trustee's avoidance 
powers. 2 
The Internal Revenue Code provides that employers and other 
persons who withhold or collect income taxes, FICA payments, excise 
taxes, and other similar monies, hold such funds in trust for the Inter-
nal Revenue Service (IRS). 3 Therefore, transfers of these trust fund 
taxes to the IRS during the ninety-day period preceding bankruptcy 
normally should not be voidable by the trustee because they are not 
transfers of the debtor's property. However, if the debtor commingles 
trust fund assets with her personal funds and the assets cease to be 
identifiable, or if the debtor disposes of trust fund assets in whole or 
part, the common law of trusts may view a pre-petition transfer to the 
IRS as voidable because it consists not of trust fund assets, but of the 
debtor's property.• 
1. II U.S.C. § 547(b) (1990). 
2. See, e.g., II U.S.C. § 541 (d) (1990); Research Planning, Inc. v. Segal (In re First Capital 
Mortgage Loan Corp.), 917 F.2d 424, 426 (lOth Cir. 1990) (by definition, property held by the 
debtor in trust is not part of the bankruptcy estate); Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Howard's Appliance 
Corp. (In re Howard's Appliance Corp.), 874 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1989) (quoting United States 
v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 205 n.10 (1983) ("Congress plainly excluded property of 
others held by the debtor in trust at the time of the filing of the petition.")); Turley v. Mahan & 
Rowsey, Inc. (In re Mahan & Rowsey, Inc.), 817 F.2d 682, 684 (lOth Cir. 1987) (money held 
under a trust arising from non-bankruptcy law is not property of the estate by definition); 4 
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1J 541.13 (15th ed. 1990). 
3. 26 U.S.C. § 7501 (a) (1990) ("Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any 
internal revenue tax from any other person ... the amount of tax so collected or withheld shall 
be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States."). 
4. E.g., Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612, 618 (1st Cir. 
1988) (claimant must identify the trust fund or property and, where the trust fund has been 
commingled with general property of the debtor, sufficiently trace the property or funds); Ameri-
can Serv. Co. v. Henderson, 120 F.2d 525,530-31 (4th Cir. 1941) (claimant to a trust fund which 
has been mingled with the general property of the debtor must sufficiently trace the trust prop-
erty); In re Auto-Train Corp., 53 Bankr. 990, 997 (Bankr. D.C. 1985) (requiring trust fund 
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However, as will be demonstrated in this casenote, the common 
law of trusts may not always control transactions in bankruptcy. In 
particular, this note looks at how the common law of trusts has been 
modified by the recent decision in Begier v. IRS.~'> It examines the his-
tory of trust fund tracing in bankruptcy prior to Begier, analyzes the 
reasons for adopting Begier's approach, and summarizes the potential 
impacts of implementing the apparent result in Begier. 
II. BACKGROUND 
As the result of the 1971 Supreme Court case of United States v. 
Randall,6 courts began to require the IRS to strictly trace all trust 
fund assets if it wished to recover such monies outside of normal bank-
ruptcy distribution channels. Randall involved a debtor who retained 
possession of withheld taxes after filing a petition in bankruptcy. The 
IRS sought to recover these taxes, arguing that the funds were property 
of the IRS and not property of the debtor. Because the monies were 
commingled with the debtor's other assets, and the IRS could not trace 
the origin of the funds to the withheld taxes, the Court refused to allow 
the IRS to recover the funds. After Randall, lower courts began to 
impose strict tracing requirements on the IRS if it sought to collect 
withheld taxes from the debtor without standing in line behind bank-
ruptcy administrative expenses and other creditors with higher priority. 
Perhaps to mitigate the effect of commingling and to ameliorate 
the IRS's burden in bankruptcy, Congress gave the IRS power to re-
quire debtors to establish separate bank accounts for the deposit of trust 
fund money.7 Additionally, when the new Bankruptcy Code was en-
acted in 1978, statements made on the floor of the House and Senate 
indicated that the IRS should not be subject to the strict trust tracing 
requirements set forth in Randall.6 Instead, courts could use "reasona-
property tracing using lowest intermediate balance test); 4 CoLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~ 541.13 
(15th ed. 1990) (where the fund or property has been mingled in the general property of the 
debtor, the claimant must sufficiently trace the property). 
5. 110 S. Ct. 2258 (1990). 
6. 401 u.s. 513 (1971). 
7. 26 U.S.C. § 7512 (1990) (implementation of this section is in the IRS's discretion and 
only if tax payment has not been timely). 
8. See 124 CoNG. REC. H32,417 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). 
Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) stated, in relevant part: 
[A] serious problem exists where "trust fund taxes" withheld from others are held to be 
property of the estate where the withheld amounts are commingled with other assets of 
the debtor. The courts should permit the use of reasonable assumptions under which 
the Internal Revenue Service ... can demonstrate that amounts of withheld taxes are 
still in the possession of the debtor at the commencement of the case. For example, 
where the debtor had commingled that amount of withheld taxes in his general check-
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ble assumptions" regarding the disposition of trust fund taxes to permit 
the IRS to recover ahead of administrative expenses. 9 
Since 1978, courts have been increasingly uncertain as to the ex-
tent to which Randall's strict tracing requirements were modified by 
the new Bankruptcy Code. Some cases have held that the IRS must still 
trace, to some extent, the source of pre-petition payments to the IRS 
during the ninety-day preference period.10 Other courts have held that 
the mere fact that payment is made means that the "reasonable as-
sumptions" test is met, and no further tracing is necessary to permit the 
IRS to retain pre-petition payments made during the preference 
period. 11 
In Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States, 12 an Ar-
kansas bankruptcy court held that the "reasonable assumptions" test 
means that any money paid to the IRS during the ninety-day pre-peti-
tion period would be classified as trust fund taxes, despite the fact that 
it was commingled with the debtor's assets and the IRS did not trace 
the trust fund monies. Payment alone was sufficient to identify the 
assets. 
However, in Drabkin v. District of Columbia/3 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia determined that "reasonable assump-
tions" means that mere payment is not enough to identify assets to the 
trust. Rather, the IRS must still trace the disposition of trust fund 
taxes. 
Neither of these cases, though, had fact patterns that exactly corre-
ing account, it might be reasonable to assume that any remaining amounts in that 
account on the commencement of the case are the withheld taxes. 
ld. See also 124 CoNG. REc. S34,017 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1978) (Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-
Ariz.) repeated the statement of Representative Don Edwards (D-Cal.) in the Senate one week 
later). 
9. See sources cited supra note 8; see also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess. 373, 
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CoDE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6329 (stating that "[a] payment of 
withholding taxes constitutes a payment of money held in trust under Internal Revenue Code § 
7501 (a), and thus will not be a preference .... "). 
10. E.g., Drabkin v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1102, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (the fact of 
payment, without more, does not create a trust for purposes of the Code); Graham v. United 
States (In re Malmart Mortgage Co.), 109 Bankr. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989) (funds paid pre-
petition must be traced to withheld taxes); Ginsberg v. Washington (In re Olympic Foundry Co.), 
63 Bankr. 324, 327-28 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 71 Bankr. 216 
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1987) (pre-petition payment of state taxes, analogous to federal withholding 
taxes, were recovered as a preference because no trust account was established and trust funds 
were not segregated). 
11. E.g., Pereira v. United States (In re Rodriguez), 50 Bankr. 576 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1985); Razorback Ready-Mix Concrete Co. v. United States (In re Razorback Ready-Mix Con-
crete Co.), 45 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1984). 
12. 45 Bankr. 917 (E.D. Ark. 1984). 
13. 824 F.2d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
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sponded to Randall. In Randall, the IRS was trying to collect trust 
fund taxes that were never paid. In Drabkin, the trust fund taxes were 
paid involuntarily and the bankruptcy trustee was trying to recover 
funds from the IRS. In Razorback, the taxpayer had voluntarily paid 
trust fund taxes which the bankruptcy trustee was trying to recover. 
Consequently, there was substantial confusion over whether the volun-
tary nature of pre-petition payments was important to the decisions. 
Also, there was uncertainty whether payment or lack thereof should be 
a determining factor in deciding what the burden on the IRS or the 
trustee should be. Since Regier involved a voluntary pre-petition pay-
ment, its holding may be limited to other similar situations. However, 
as will be discussed later, the language of the Regier decision is so 
broad that it may be applied in future IRS trust fund tax cases, regard-
less of either the voluntary nature of payment or the lack of payment 
altogether. 
III. Regier v. IRS 
A. Facts 
American International Airways (AlA) was having trouble meet-
ing its FICA, excise, and income tax withholding payments to the IRS. 
Consequently, the IRS required AlA to establish a section 7512 ac-
count14 to deposit future tax payments. AlA established the account but 
neglected to deposit all payments as required. However, AlA did begin 
to make timely tax payments. The payments were made both from 
AlA's general corporate bank accounts and from the trust account. 15 
Some time later, AlA filed bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee, Harry 
P. Begier, Jr., tried to set aside payments made to the IRS during the 
ninety-day pre-petition period. 
B. Court Decisions 
The bankruptcy court held that the trustee could avoid payments 
made from the general corporate accounts, but that payments from the 
trust account were held in trust for the IRS and were not "property of 
the debtor" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code. 16 The Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuitl7 and, ultimately, the Supreme 
14. 26 U.S.C. § 7512 (1990); see supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
15. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2261 (1990). 
16. Begier v. IRS (In re American lnt'l Airways, Inc.), 83 Bankr. 324 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 
1988). 
17. Begier v. IRS, 878 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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Court18 reversed the bankruptcy court, holding that all amounts paid to 
the IRS were held in trust by AlA and were not "property of the 
debtor."19 
IV. How Begier MoDIFIES THE IRS's TRACING BuRDEN 
A. The Circumstance in Which the Tracing Burden Is Clearly Es-
tablished-The Case of Voluntary Transfer 
The Supreme Court's decision in Begier requires that there be 
some nexus between the money that the IRS claims for trust fund taxes 
and the actual taxes that the debtor withholds. The Court definitively 
finds a sufficient connection to exist when money is voluntarily trans-
ferred pre-petition to the IRS.20 Therefore, if the IRS can establish 
that the debtor voluntarily transferred money at any time prior to 
bankruptcy, the IRS will be entitled to keep such funds. 
B. Circumstances in Which the Tracing Burden Is Un-
clear-Involuntary Transfer or Non-Payment 
Unfortunately, if limited to its facts alone, Begier does not give 
clear guidance as to what other connections, besides voluntary payment 
by the debtor, are sufficient to allow the IRS to exclude assets from the 
bankruptcy estate. If the debtor never makes a pre-petition transfer of 
trust fund monies, as was the case in Randall, what is the tracing 
burden on the IRS? Must the IRS revert to strict tracing, as in Ran-
dall, or is it now permitted to recover the money, even if no transfer is 
ever made and without further tracing? Also, Begier, on its facts, does 
not directly address the issue of whether involuntary payments are to 
be treated the same as voluntary payments. Therefore, an important 
question in the Begier decision is its implication for future cases with 
somewhat dissimilar facts. 
1. Strict tracing rule of Randall overturned 
The Supreme Court stated in Begier that "[t]he strict [tracing] rule 
of Randall . . . did not survive the adoption of the new bankruptcy 
code."21 By this statement the Court appears to rule out the possibility 
that courts in future cases, where no money is transferred, will apply 
18. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258 (1990). 
19. !d. at 2260; Begier v. IRS, 878 F.2d 762, 771 (3d Cir. 1989). 
20. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. at 2267 ("[T]he House Report identifies one such [reasonable] 
assumption to be that any voluntary pre-petition payment of trust-fund taxes out of the debtor's 
assets is not a transfer of the debtor's property."). 
21. /d. at 2266. 
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the strict tracing requirements of Randall. However, the Court also 
seems to support the idea that some burden must be placed on the IRS 
to " 'demonstrate that amounts of withheld taxes are still in the posses-
sion of the debtor at the commencement of the case.' " 22 The Court 
asserts that "Congress expected that the IRS would have to show some 
connection between the section 7501 trust and the assets sought to be 
applied to a debtor's trust-fund tax obligations."23 While the implica-
tion of these statements is not clear, it is clear that the strict tracing 
requirements of Randall were overturned by the enactment of the new 
Bankruptcy Code. 
2. The rule to replace Randall 
If Randall's tracing requirements have been overturned by Begier, 
what then is the appropriate tracing burden the IRS must meet in cases 
where no pre-petition payments are made or are made involuntarily? 
The concurring opinion in Begier offers at least some guidance in an-
swering this question. Justice Scalia suggests that, at a minimum, the 
taxpayer must have enough assets in her possession at the time of filing 
to be able to pay the amount due the IRS.24 If she does not, it would be 
impossible to show any connection between the section 7501 trust and 
the assets which either are non-existent at the time of filing or never 
existed at all. 211 Therefore, one possible limitation to the IRS's right to 
collect trust fund taxes outside normal bankruptcy distribution channels 
might be the fact that the debtor does not have sufficient assets even to 
pay her trust fund taxes. 
However, such a limitation does not seem to be much of a burden 
on the IRS. If the IRS is allowed to recover trust fund taxes in all 
circumstances, except where the debtor does not have sufficient assets to 
pay the taxes, in essence, the IRS will always be entitled to collect trust 
fund taxes ahead of bankruptcy administrative expenses and other 
higher priority creditors. 
The language used by the majority, though, seems to support this 
notion of bankruptcy side-stepping for the IRS. Such a conclusion can 
be derived from a careful reading of the Court's interpretation of the 
function and scope of a section 7501 trust. The Court agreed with the 
22. /d. (quoting 124 CoNG. REc. H32,417 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (remarks of Rep. 
Edwards)). 
23. /d. 
24. /d. at 2269 (Scalia, J., concurring). "When I pay a worker $90 there is no clearly identi-
fiable locus of $10 in withheld taxes that I do not pay him. Indeed, if my total assets at the time of 
the payment are $90 there is no conceivable locus." /d. 
25. /d. 
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legislative history that the IRS could recover if it "could demonstrate 
the amounts of withheld taxes were still in the debtor's possession at 
the time the petition was filed."26 This statement seems to indicate that 
only the abstract "amount" of tax, not the actual physical funds col-
lected, need be in the debtor's possession at the time the bankruptcy 
petition is filed. Therefore, if the IRS can show that the assets in the 
debtor's possession equal or exceed the amount of taxes due, the IRS 
may have met its tracing burden. 
This conclusion is further reinforced by the Court's reference to a 
section 7501 trust as a different creature than a common law trust. The 
Court states: 
A § 7501 trust is radically different from the common-law paradigm, 
however. That provision states that "the amount of [trust-fund] tax 
. . . collected or withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust 
for the United States." Unlike a common-law trust, in the which the 
settlor sets aside particular property as the trust res, § 7501 creates a 
trust in an abstract "amount" -a dollar figure not tied to any par-
ticular assets-rather than in the actual dollars withheld. 27 
In essence, the Court is mandating a new type of trust, limited to 
trusts created under section 7501. This new type of trust violates the 
well-established principle that a trust cannot exist unless identifiable 
and separate assets can be shown to create a trust res. 28 Nevertheless, 
the Court justifies this result by asserting that "[t]he general common-
law rule that a trust is not created absent a designation of particular 
property obviously does not invalidate section 7 501 's creation of a trust 
in the 'amount' of withheld taxes. The common law of trusts is not 
binding on Congress."29 By so stating, the Court apparently finds that 
26. /d. at 2266 (quoting 124 CoNG. Rt:c. H32,417) (remarks of Rep. Edwards)). 
27. /d. at 2265 (emphasis added). 
28. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
29. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 n.4 (1990) (emphasis added). The Court's conclu-
sion may open doors for federal and state legislatures that wish to recast liens on debtor's property 
as trusts. If, for instance, states pass environmental laws which establish a trust in the debtor's 
property equal to the "amount" of damage caused by hazardous waste pollution on the debtor's 
property, such a statute may give the state a position in bankruptcy ahead of other creditors and 
administrative expenses. Of course, this assumes that the common law of trusts is also not binding 
on state legislatures. Prior to Begier, most courts did not allow states to invent trust tracing rules 
that did not provide for identification of the actual corpus of the trust. See, e.g., Torres v. Eastlick 
(In re North Am. Coin & Currency, Ltd.), 767 F.2d 1573, 1575 (9th Cir. 1985) (refusing to 
apply state constructive trust rules in bankruptcy proceedings); Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749, 754 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 829 (1966) (state law which purported to dispense with need to 
trace trust assets held inapplicable in bankruptcy). For a look at the states' problems in collecting 
environmental cleanup costs from polluters and some of the current statutory mechanisms to en-
able collection, see Note, Recovering Costs for Cleaning Up Hazardous Waste Sites: An Exami-
nation of State Superlien Statutes, 63 IND. L.J. 571 (1988). 
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Congress intended to change the common law of trusts for the benefit of 
the IRS and that Congress has such power. 
Yet, the Court's ruling seems to go further than necessary. The 
Court easily could have ruled in favor of the IRS without rewriting 
trust law. Because the debtor in this case was the settlor of the trust 
and made the tax payments, the Court could have concluded that the 
debtor identified the trust by virtue of her payment to the IRS. This 
would have drawn a narrow rule and preserved current trust law.30 In 
addition, the Court did not have to rely on overturning Randall to 
arrive at its decision. Instead, the Court could have distinguished Begier 
on the basis of the voluntary payment-a fact not present in Randall. 
However, the Court's reliance on other, broader means to reach its de-
cision implies intent to make Begier broadly applicable to all IRS trust 
fund tax cases, including circumstances where no payment is made or 
where the payment is made involuntarily. 
V. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR ADOPTING Begier's APPROACH 
A. Relief for Responsible Persons 
One of the primary purposes for the existence of the Bankruptcy 
Code is to give relief and a "fresh start" to honest debtors who encoun-
ter difficulty paying debts. However, in certain circumstances, this pur-
pose may be somewhat frustrated by federal laws which allow various 
types of debt to be excluded from discharge in bankruptcy.31 
Trust fund taxes, in some cases, are an example of a non-
dischargeable debt which, if not paid in bankruptcy, will continue to 
burden the debtor or debtor's officers with a continuing obligation to 
pay the taxes, even after successful completion of a plan of reorganiza-
tion or liquidation. The Internal Revenue Code provides: 
Any person required to collect . . . any tax imposed by this title who 
willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay 
over such tax . . . shall, in addition to other penalties provided by 
law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded 
32 
Under this provision, any trust fund money which is not collected 
30. See, e.g., G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 111 (rev. 2d ed. 1988) (a trust 
does not come into existence until the settlor identifies an ascertainable interest in property to be 
the trust res). 
31. See Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 110 S. Ct. 2126 (1990) (expres-
sing concern that exceptions to discharge are frustrating the policy of the Bankruptcy Code). But 
see Kelley v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36 (1986). 
32. 26 U.S.C. § 6672(a) (1990). 
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from the estate may be collected from the person(s) responsible for pay-
ing over the withheld taxes. If the full tax is not recovered from the 
estate, the IRS may still pursue collection of the tax after discharge.33 
Therefore, the debtor or the debtor's agents responsible for trust fund 
payments will, if the IRS is not paid in full in bankruptcy, continue to 
be burdened with personal liability for trust fund taxes, even after all 
other debts have been discharged. 
However, if the result in Begier is extended to all trust fund tax 
cases, the threat of non-dischargeable trust fund tax liability will de-
crease. The minimal tracing requirements imposed by Begier will en-
sure, in many cases, that all IRS trust fund tax claims will be paid in 
bankruptcy, leaving no residual obligation after completion of bank-
ruptcy. Thus, persons responsible for making tax payments will not be 
further burdened with liability for such debts. 
B. Federal Budget Deficits 
One other potential reason for expanding Begier to cover all trust 
fund tax obligations in bankruptcy centers on the political events and 
fiscal developments currently afoot in the United States. Congress has 
found it increasingly difficult to balance federal spending with tax reve-
nues. 34 Budget deficits have become a way of life in Washington. Con-
gress finds it easier to increase spending to benefit constituents but is 
uneasy about increasing taxes to match higher spending-probably out 
of fear of voter backlash. Therefore, it is politically preferable to collect 
additional monies under the current tax structure than to change the 
taxing mechanisms, a process that would be subject to much greater 
public scrutiny. By allowing the IRS to avoid standing in line behind 
administrative expenses and creditors with higher priority status, the 
government will be able to collect additional taxes without the corre-
sponding increased visibility of a tax hike. Consequently, Begier's ap-
proach is politically expedient. 
VI. UNANSWERED PoTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH Begier's 
FoRMULATION 
If the Begier alternative to strict tracing results in bankruptcy 
side-stepping for the IRS, there are several potential problems and 
questions which will need to be addressed in the future. This note ex-
33. See United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978) (holding in a five-to-four decision that 
the funds involved in 26 U.S.C. § 6672 were taxes not dischargeable by virtue of II U.S.C. § 
507(a)(6)(C), 523(a)(I)(A)). 
34. See, e.g., Mitchell, Save the Gramm-Rudman Sequester, HERITAGE FoUND. REP. (Apr. 
3, 1990) (suggesting that federal spending and budget deficits continue to grow uncontrollably). 
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amines a few of these concerns, although there are undoubtedly many 
others, in order to point out some difficulties that may lie ahead if the 
abstract trust concept is implemented as Regier seems to recommend. 
A. What Is the Scope of "Amount"?-The Priority Problem 
Traditionally, secured creditors in bankruptcy have been repaid 
out of the collateral which secured their right to payment. However, if, 
as Regier suggests, the IRS is entitled to recover its trust fund tax claim 
out of the "amounts" in the debtor's possession, without the need to 
trace the source of those amounts to the associated trust fund taxes, it 
may be possible that secured creditors will have their collateral taken to 
pay debtor's trust fund taxes. 
For example, assume that debtor, D, has trust fund tax liabilities 
of $1 ,000,000 and non-exempt property, Blackacre, valued at 
$1,000,000. D has no other exempt assets. However, C, a secured cred-
itor of D, has a valid security interest in Blackacre to secure an obliga-
tion of $500,000. D files bankruptcy. Thereafter, the IRS seeks to seize 
Blackacre, arguing that the amount of withheld taxes was in D's pos-
session at the commencement of the case in the form of Blackacre. 
Therefore, the IRS, if successful, will arguably be entitled to dispose of 
Blackacre outside bankruptcy, leaving the estate with no assets from 
which to pay the otherwise secured creditor. 
Of course, in the situation above, C might argue that because 
Blackacre is subject to its lien, D does not have the amount of taxes still 
in his possession. Instead, D has only $500,000 in his possession, the 
total value of Blackacre less the amount of C's lien. In other words, C 
may allege that "amount" refers only to unencumbered assets. Alterna-
tively, C may argue that "amount" refers only to money in D's posses-
sion, not to land or personalty which D owns. In any event, the deter-
mination of the exact meaning or scope of the word "amount" may 
have profound implications for debtor-creditor transactions in the fu-
ture if Regier is applied to cases involving the non-payment of trust 
fund taxes. 
A similar problem with the majority opinion in Regier, suggested 
by Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion, is illustrated by the follow-
ing example. 311 Suppose debtor, D, has assets valued at $1,000,000. 
However, the IRS has a claim for trust fund taxes equalling 
$1,500,000. Does the argument that a trust automatically arises, in a 
sum equal to the amount of withheld taxes, apply in this case? The 
bankruptcy trustee presumably will argue that because the IRS cannot 
35. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1990); see supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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demonstrate that D has the full amount of trust fund taxes in her pos-
session, the IRS cannot recover anything. The trustee will claim that a 
trust could not possibly have arisen in the amount of the withheld taxes 
because such sum does not even exist. The IRS will probably argue, in 
response, that to the extent that D has some of the amount of the tax in 
her possession, the IRS is entitled to that amount ahead of administra-
tive and higher priority claims. 
In short, Begier leaves unanswered the potential scope of the word 
"amount." If future cases pay heed to the logic underlying the decision, 
there will necessarily be much future litigation to decide whether 
"amount" means property as well as money and whether the term en-
compasses all property and money or merely items not covered by valid 
security interests. These future cases may also decide whether a trust 
can even arise in the amount of the tax if the debtor never had suffi-
cient assets to pay such tax. 
B. Does Begier Promote Equitable Distribution Principles? 
If a debtor has trust fund liability which equals the value of her 
assets, then arguably, under Begier the IRS may be able to take posses-
sion of all the debtor's assets, even after a petition in bankruptcy has 
been filed. Under such circumstances, the estate would be left with 
nothing to distribute. Administrative expenses would not be paid. At-
torneys would not be able to collect their fees. Other priority creditors 
would not recover anything. Secured creditors would be left without 
collateral. Instead, the IRS would take everything. 
Such a result is contrary to the equitable distribution principles 
underlying the entire bankruptcy process.36 Rather, it seems to promote 
a policy of inequitable distribution. Instead of dividing the debtor's as-
sets among creditors, Begier may allow the IRS to dispose of most of 
the debtor's estate, leaving few assets for other creditors. This exact 
criticism led the Court in Randall to conclude that "the statutory pol-
icy of subordinating taxes to costs and expenses of administration 
would not be served by creating or enforcing trusts which eat up an 
estate leaving little or nothing for creditors and court officers . . . ."37 
The Randall criticism of allowing the IRS to extract trust fund 
taxes without tracing their source seems even more appropriate in light 
of the system of priorities explicitly established in the Bankruptcy 
Code. Section 507 specifically provides that taxes are to be paid only 
after administrative expenses and five additional types of priority 
36. See id. at 2261. 
37. United States v. Randall, 401 U.S. 513, 517 (1971). 
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claims. 38 By elevating certain taxes above these other claims, the judici-
ary circumvents the language of the Bankruptcy Code, in direct contra-
diction of the legislature's intended treatment of such taxes. 
C. Will Section 7512 Lose Its Importance? 
Section 7512 allows the IRS to require debtors to establish sepa-
rate bank accounts for the deposit of trust fund taxes. 39 As previously 
noted, the ostensible purpose of this provision may be to prevent com-
mingling of trust fund taxes with debtor's personal assets, thus making 
it easier for the IRS to trace the disposition of such taxes.40 But if 
Begier gives the IRS the ability to take any and all assets in the 
debtor's possession upon bankruptcy, the provision may become a use-
less tool. The IRS will not be concerned if there is not strict segregation 
of debtor's property and trust fund taxes. After all, if Regier's analysis 
holds true, as long as the IRS can show that the debtor has the 
"amount" of taxes in her possession, it may win with no other showing. 
As a result, the utility of section 7 512 as a tracing aid may be com-
pletely lost. 
D. Does Begier Venture into New Uncharted Trust Rules? 
If trusts of abstract "amounts" can be created, is Begier a first step 
toward a new perception of trust law? If it is, what form will the trust 
rules take? Will different trust rules apply depending on whether a 
governmental entity or a private concern is the beneficiary of the trust? 
Will it become possible to create floating trusts-trusts which have no 
identifiable res but merely "float" over unidentified assets-in non-
bankruptcy situations? These and other questions are the most difficult 
and perhaps the most important issues raised by Begier. The Supreme 
Court's simple statement that "the common law of trusts is not binding 
on Congress"41 may be nothing more than a blot of ink in a reporter, 
or it may be the beginning of the end for trust law as now practiced. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Begier firmly cements new trust tracing rules to the IRS's benefit. 
However, the limits of these rules and their eventual impact is subject 
to less concrete suppositions. Nevertheless, the answer to at least one 
question is clear from Begier: If a debtor makes a voluntary payment of 
38. 11 u.s.c. § 507 (1990). 
39. 26 u.s.c. § 7512 (1990). 
40. See supra text accompanying note 7. 
41. Begier v. IRS, 110 S. Ct. 2258, 2265 n.4 (1990). 
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trust fund taxes to the IRS prior to bankruptcy, such a transfer is never 
subject to avoidance. However, if no transfer is made, or if a transfer is 
made involuntarily, courts cannot use Begier to determine the IRS's 
entitlement to be paid outside normal bankruptcy distribution channels. 
With the above concepts in mind, some statements made in Begier 
point to a possible new view of the IRS's right to payment in bank-
ruptcy. Begier may eliminate the need for the IRS to trace withheld 
taxes. Instead, in future cases the IRS may be required to show only 
that the debtor had sufficient funds to pay the tax at the time of filing 
bankruptcy. If this is the end result, Begier may spell relief for persons 
responsible for paying trust fund taxes, thus not only assisting the 
Treasury in filling the federal government's coffers but also aiding 
Congress in balancing the federal budget. However, it may also present 
unanswered priority questions in bankruptcy by causing bankruptcy to 
shift toward payment of government claims and away from equitable 
distribution principles. In addition, Begier may be an experiment which 
ultimately changes basic trust rules. With unanswered questions wait-
ing in the wings, Begier may play a leading role in developing new 
concepts and practices in modern bankruptcy law, or it simply may 
remain off-stage-a faceless member of a forgotten cast of innovative 
but impractical cases. 
Guy Lamoyne Black 
